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Amid its romantic excesses such as “[t]o believe your own thought, to
believe that what is true for you in your private heart, is true for all
men,—that is genius” (Porte 2001, 121), Emersonian individualism
remains a living project, one we would do well to understand more thor-
oughly and pursue more rigorously. To aid in this recovery, I will, in a
translating repetition of Emerson’s thought that engages a range of texts,
offer eight theses that any successful reconstruction of individualism
must embrace.
1
I am not claiming that these theses are unique to
Emerson; others hold similar views. I have elected to work with
Emerson, however, because his work eludes the exhausted opposition
between atomistic and collectivist accounts of human flourishing.
Emerson thinks in severely relational terms. I say “severely relational”
because he both denies the possibility of an atomistic self and refuses
to dissolve human beings into, or defer our endeavors to, the systemic
activities of macrosubjectivities like culture, states, traditional com-
munities, civil-social associations, ecosystems, or even a divinity.
Because he broaches the issue of how individuals are private and pub-
lic, solitary and engaged, Emerson strikes me as a salutary interlocutor
for those who would rethink individualism.
1. Individualism Requires Conscious Self-Fashioning
Permit me a point of stipulation and clarification. In metaphysics, we
might speak of singular beings as individuals, and distinguish them from
larger collectivities to which they may or may not belong. In this sense,
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anything that exists as a categorically distinct entity is an “individual,” e.g., a
shoe or muskrat. Here, however, I will treat individuals as accomplishments. In
this sense, individuality is not a state coextensive with existing, but one that a
person might more or less achieve.
In the work of Emerson, we readily find the thought that individuals are
accomplishments: “The Intellect still asks that a man be born” (Porte 2001, 82).
And: “So many promising youths, and never a finished man” (99). A human
being must be born at least twice: once from a womb (of one kind or another),
and then again through his or her own hands. The latter activity requires the indi-
viduation of forces that inform our being, e.g., language, as well those events
that manifest it, such as our beliefs and actions. For example, through my writ-
ing and speech, I might develop a style of my own, half lyric ventures, half wise-
cracks. Thus, to paraphrase Cavell, I might earn the right to say ‘I am’ by
acquiring the capacity to richly say ‘I think’ (Heller 1986, 282). Or, to draw the
thinking thing into more obvious transactions, I might fret that my profession is
less mine than some set of demands that one-sidedly shape me. If so, if what we
could call individuation is lacking, we may persist as metaphysical individuals
but live as replicas.
I speak of individuation because individuality follows from activities such as
journaling, friendships, walking in the woods, and buying goods, which enable
us to bring our intuitions and inspirations about what to do and believe—e.g.,
protest an impending war or regard the academy within an archly capitalist social
order—to bear on the various modalities of our being—e.g. neighbor, man,
teacher, and so forth. In a perhaps broader sense, individuation also entails allow-
ing an emerging sense of self, for instance as a site of ecopolitical becoming, to
wash over our many beliefs, actions, and roles, tuning them, as it were, such that
they acknowledge who emerges. Or, in more Emersonian terms, we could say
that individuation occurs when we subordinate our inheritance to our genius, a
point I’ll develop below.
2. Individualism is an Ethical Project
Addressing Harvard Divinity School, Emerson stated: “The intuition of the moral
sentiment is an insight of the perfection of the laws of the soul” (Porte 2001, 70).
In the full context of Emerson’s writings, this is an abundant passage. At this
juncture, however, my point is simple: soul work, for Emerson, must be respon-
sive to moral concerns. Not all influences are desirable; not all beliefs and actions
are praiseworthy. Individuation is thus not only a process of translation but also
of selection and rejection. We can always ask whether or not we have chosen
well. For example, should I champion Emerson in this project, or turn to less
canonical, less routinely championed figures? Moreover, given the range of our
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influences, questions of emphasis and rank also pertain. As the ‘war on every-
thing’ continues and a Reich of oil barons looms in the shadows, is this the time
to reflect upon and teach issues surrounding the individual? These questions arise
because individuation is an ethically bound activity, subject to measures of jus-
tice and to considerations of rank concerning its goodness.
Lest you think I am making too much of a passage from the Divinity School
address, let me say more about the status of conscience in Emerson’s writing.
Reflecting on Montaigne and thus on skepticism in the labor of self-cultivation,
Emerson writes: “The final solution in which Skepticism is lost is, in the moral
sentiment, which never forfeits its supremacy. All moods may be safely tried, and
their weight allowed to all objections: the moral sentiment as easily outweighs
them all, as any one. This is the drop that balances the sea” (246). Likewise, con-
sidering Shakespeare and thus addressing the role of the poet, Emerson chastises
Shakespeare because “[h]e rested in . . . beauty; and never took the step which
seemed inevitable to such genius, namely, to explore the virtue which resides in
these symbols . . .” (259). For Emerson, then, the moral cannot be bracketed, even
through a division of cognitive labor that distinguishes morality from the aesthetic
or the theoretical. Instead, we are always morally claimed.
3. Individuation Must Be Understood Dialectically
In “The Over-Soul,” Emerson writes: “Man is a stream whose source is hidden.
Our being is descending into us from we know not whence”(163). We are crea-
tures of inspiration; thoughts come to us on their own rather than in response to
our summons. Decisions occur when we find ourselves resolved, not in response
to executive orders. I thus regard individuation as a responsive project, one in
which we are witnesses to our emergence and the sallies of our genius, only cul-
tivating the former according to the latter after the fact. Foreshadowing Dewey’s
emphasis on primary experience, Emerson writes: “That which each can do best,
none but his [sic] Maker can teach him. No man yet knows what it is, nor can,
till that person has exhibited it” (134).
Ontogenetically, this thesis can be put in another way, and with different
import. We exist through what we are not. Non-self forces (what Emerson in
“Nature” terms the ‘not-me’), constitute us, e.g., the books we read, the histori-
cal period to which we are born, our town, climate, and so forth. Emerson writes
in “Quotation and Originality” that “[t]here is imitation, model, and suggestion,
to the very archangels, if we knew their history” (320). Our dependency is not
just a matter of intellectual influence, however. In “History,” one finds that “[h]e
[sic] is the compend of time: he is also the correlative of nature. His power con-
sists in the multitude of his affinities, in the fact that his life is intertwined with
the whole chain of organic and inorganic being” (118). Thus when Emerson
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w rites in his 1840 journal, “[i]n all my lectures, I have taught one doctrine,
namely, the infinitude of the private man” (503), we must be careful not to oppose
“private” and “relational.” The two intertwine.
These two thoughts, that we are not the authors of what is most intimate to
us and that the private opens onto the not-me even as the not-me announces itself
to and through the p rivate, have implications for how we think individuation,
genius’s subordination of our inheritances. In “Spiritual Laws,” Emerson writes:
“Human character evermore pub lishes itself. The most fugitive deed and word,
the mere doing of a thing, the intimated purpose, expresses character” (159).
Keeping to this image, self-cultivation requires that we become expe rt readers
of our own publications, whether they are thoughts, actions, or desires.
Individuation is thus not simply a willful subordination of the not-me, but also
a process of husbanding the various elements and forces that inform our being
according to flashes of genius, what Emerson terms “the last fact behind which
analysis cannot go.”
4. The Dialectical Nature of Individuation Entails that
Becoming an Individual Is Not a Solitary, Atomistic Project
Let me repeat the above point. In “Quotation and Originality,” Emerson insists
that “[o]riginal power is usua lly accompanied by assimilating power” (325). And,
more forcefully: “Our best thoughts came from others. We heard in their words
a deeper sense than the speakers put into them and could express ourselves in
other people’s phrases to finer purposes than they knew” (327). In my words,
individuation comes into its own through a translating repetition. Our social inter-
dependencies are not only textual, however. In a lecture from Conduct ofLife,
Emerson writes: “You cannot have one well-bred [read ‘individuated’—JTL]
man without a whole society of such” (Emerson 1904, 149). In other words, indi-
viduation must make use of resources that percolate in the texts, practices, insti-
tutions, and persons through which we come to ourselves in the first place.
In “The American Scholar,” Emerson writes that “[s]o much of nature as he
is ignorant of, so much of his own mind does he not yet possess. And, in fine,
the ancient precept ‘know thyself,’ and the modern precept, ‘study nature,’
become at last one maxim” (Porte 2001, 58). For Emerson, it is not only hum an
artifacts and mentors that open us to ourselves. The more-th an-human world also
sponsors self-knowledge. As he told a Boston audience gathered to hear him
deliver a lecture titled “Human Culture,” “[n]atural objects address him [sic]. If
he looks at a flower it awakes in him a pleasing emotion. He cannot see a stone,
but his fancy and his understanding are attracted to the va rieties of its texture and
law of its crystallization, until he finds even this rude body is no stranger to him,
and though it cannot speak, yet it is the history of the earth down to a pe riod of
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written history” (Whicher et al. 1964, 221). Emerson’s point is twofold. The
more-than-human world stimulates our capacities, giving us access to ourselves
vis-a-vis those capacities. But that same world also addresses us. And in that
address, in its story of emanating forms and organisms, we discover that not only
does the more-than-human world stimulate our capacities, but our capacities are
manifestations of that world as well, say, in the way our eyes interact with light
in sight, or the air both carries and is our voice. In its strivings, in what the late
Foucault would have regarded as a kind of askesis, individuation must work with
and among the full multiplicity of beings and forces whose stamp can be found
within us.
5. Despite its Dialectical Nature, Individuation Requires
Spontaneous, Reflective, and Personal Participation
I take this to be the dialectical pair of the fourth thesis. Although we are crea-
tures of relation, and primordially so, the relation is genuine. We are not simply
parts of larger wholes but contribute to the whole. 2 We thus belong to the whole
in our own manner, and it is that particular relation of subject and object that we
are that individuation, through translating repetitions guided by genius, must dis-
cover and fashion in an ethical manner.
A perhaps unexpected implication of the truly relational nature of individua-
tion as a practice of self-cultivation is that no one can do the labor of self-dis-
covery and self-fashioning for us. This is not just a matter of Emersonian
bravado, the kind that berates our inner lemmings because we too often “shun
the rugged battle of fate, where strength is born” (Porte 2001, 131). We may rely
upon others along the way, whether for illumination or support (say in the form
of cash or cheer—I think here of the diverse support Emerson offered the Alcott
family). But no one can play our part in individuation. At the close of the initial
Boston lecture on culture, Emerson instructed his audience on this point. “I have
as much doubt as any one of the value of general rules. There are heights of char-
acter to which a man [sic] must ascend alone—not to be foreshown,—that can
only exist by the arrival of the man and the crisis” (Whicher et al. 1964, 229).
This point, profound in its import, is more complex than might appear. First,
our participation is a necessary if not sufficient part of the project of individua-
tion. As many know from failed intimacies, another cannot persuade us to love.
Or, as many know from athletic activities, on some days we try, on others not,
and no one can try for us. As Emerson writes in his journal, seeing the matter
from the other side: “I can be wise very well for myself, but not for another”
(Whicher 1957, 138). Second, who each of us is, and whether we will follow our
genius or the path of the toddy cannot be forecast, even by the one who must
weather the crisis, understood here as an ever present and always arriving turn-
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ing point. Again, our being descends into us from elsewhere, and thus even
should we brace ourselves with a promise, we cannot say how we will acquit
ourselves or even what precisely we will face until the moment is upon us, or
rather, past. In the work of self-fashioning, then, we are always up for grabs. This
is why Emerson is right to say in “Self-Reliance” that “the way, the thought, the
good shall be wholly strange and new. It shall exclude example and experience”
(Porte 2001, 129). Or, in the language of his lectures entitled “The Philosophy of
History”: “The simple fact is that wisdom is not transferable, that the wisdom of
any past age or person cannot be barrelled up for use today. Always life is to be
administered by the new and fresh action of the soul” (Whicher et al. 1964, 166).
6. A Project of Individualism Requires a
Theory of Culture in the Sense of Bildung
In a jou rnal entry dated March 4, 1838, one that reappears later in his lectures
on human culture, Emerson writes: “Culture in the high sense, does not consist
in polishing or varnishing, but in so presenting the attractions of nature that the
slumbering attributes of man may burst their iron sleep and rush, full grown, into
day” (Whicher 1957, 85). On my reading, we awaken slumbering attributes by
intimately engaging a set of insights and practices responsive to what were ear-
lier termed the “laws of the soul,” e.g., dependency on tradition, participation in
multiple hum an and more-than-human ecologies, the solitude of our choices, the
muse-like nature of the intuitions to which ‘all other teachings are tuitions,’ and
so forth. Viewed from afar, such a program in part involves tutelage at the h ands
of representative characters, other selves whose achievements provoke, instruct,
and cheer, for instance, Emerson himself, Mother Jones, or Lenin. Up close,
however, within the work of individuation, each figure offers, perhaps repeat-
edly, a point at which our genius will struggle to announce its affirmations and
negations, and with a judgment that, strictly speaking, can have no forebears.
We shouldn’t abstract encounters with representative characters from larger
contexts of interaction, however. Emerson’s commitment to public lecturing as
well as his jealous concern for time in his study manifests a feel for how various
sites and practices facilitate differently the labor of individuation. The larger
point, though, is that a theory of Bildung must grapple with its own pragmatics,
the sites and practices within which self-expe rience and self-work unfold. Now,
we may have doubts about the effectiveness of public lectures in the face of other
circumstances. So does Emerson, who was aware that social forces conspire
against self-cultivation. In December of 1837, he wrote. “I need not specify with
accusing finger the unsound parts of our social life. A universal p rinciple of com-
promise has crept into use. A Routine which no m an made and for whose abuses
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no man holds himself accountable tyrannizes over the spontaneous will and char-
acter of all individuals” (Whicher et al. 1964, 218). In “The Method of Nature,”
however, in a lecture delivered in 1841, Emerson pointed a finger.
I do not wish to look with sour aspect at the industrious manufacturing village,
or the mart of commerce. . . . I look on trade and every mechanical craft as
education also. But let me disc riminate what is precious herein. There is in
each of these works an act of invention, an intellectual step, or short se ries of
steps taken; that act or step is the spiritual act; all the re st is mere repetition of
the same a thousand times. And I will not be deceived into admiring the rou-
tine of h andicrafts and mechanics, how splendid soever the result, any more
than I admire the routine of the scholars or the cleric class. . . . I would not
have the laborer sacrificed to the result,—I would not have the laborer sacri-
ficed to my convenience and pride, nor to that of a great class of such as me.
Let there be worse cotton and better men. (Porte 2001, 81–82)
This passage, still resonant and provocative, makes plain how human beings
might lose individuation in stupefying, repetitive activities that have no place for
their spontaneous, personal participation, that have no room for genius. But it
also evidences an awareness that self-cultivation—and permit me the irony—
cultivates others. Our account of Bildung must recognize, therefore, not only
how individuation requires others for inspiration and support, and how it unfolds
within context-bound pragmatics, but also how our own cultivation forms a part
of that web of relations that outline the prospects of others. In other words, a pro-
gram of Bildung need not, in fact cannot, coherently champion self over other.
7. Individuation Produces Character
Although reflection is a necessary element of individuation (and here Emerson
favors, as “The Poet” shows, the imagination and its loving syntheses over the
spying, discursive analyses of the understanding and the speculative flights of
reason), individuation culminates less in a conception of oneself than in charac-
ter, that is, in the dispositions and habits that inform the majority of our conduct
(191–92, 187). Emerson announces in “The American Scholar” that “[c]harac-
ter is higher than intellect. Thinking is the function. Living is the functionary.
The stream retreats to its source” (63). Given the responsive nature of thought,
individuation must work on the dispositions and bearings out of which thoughts
emerge, e.g., moods, labor, where and how one walks, friendships, etc. Then one
will begin to stand upright, for as we are told in “Self-Reliance,” “[t]he force of
character is cumulative. All the foregone days of virtue work their health into
this (126). And, “[d]o your work and you shall reinforce yourself” (124).
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8. Individuated Characters Are Perpetually
Open to the Future
In “Nature,” Emerson writes: “The health of the eye seems to demand a horizon”
(31). Why? We are always arriving. As mortal beings the forces that determine
us are not ascertainable as a whole. Adrift in the dialectical relationships that we
are, we lack the view from everywhere. Emerson observes in “Circles”: “Every
ultimate fact is only the first of a new series. Every general law is only a partic-
ular fact of some more general law presently to disclose itself” (175). To the
degree that we can, we thus need to push beyond what passes for ourselves
toward our ever-impending arrival. The problem is not simply a limited per-
spective, however, but that one fact, Emerson avers, that “the world hates—that
the soul becomes” (129). Emerson writes in his journal of 1845, “[m]etamor-
phosis is the law of the universe. All forms are fluent, and as the bird alights on
the bough and pauses for rest, then plunges into the air again on its way, so the
thoughts of God pause but for a moment in any form, but pass into a new form”
(513). Even for the most diligent self-fashioner human life relentlessly unfolds,
and thus we continually face the task of tracing and realigning ourselves amid
our own ecstasies, even seeking out conditions that might ignite them.
In another journal entry, this one from the spring of 1846, we find: “You must
treat the days respectfully, you must be a day yourself” (513). This suggests that
individuation unfolds in a time that gives way. If for Aristotle the good life is
measured across the span of a life, for Emerson our pacing is too variable for
such an extended regard. Instead, he contents himself with daily bread, writing
in “Experience”: “Since our office is with moments, let us husband them” (204).
With more time, I might convince you that Emerson’s many representative
characters (poets, scholars, preachers, skeptics, and so forth) have an appointed
time (and mood), and that appreciating each involves acquiring the capacity to
open ourselves to particular futures. For example, and here I invoke “Experience,”
sometimes we don’t know where we’re heading, and our footing is less than sure.
“All things swim and glimmer. . . . Ghostlike we glide through nature, and should
not know our place again” (198). At these times, when our genius fails, when we
are “like millers on the lower level of a stream, when the factories above them
have exhausted the water,” we must huddle with a humbling insight. “The indi-
vidual is always mistaken. . . . It turns out somewhat new, and very unlike what
he [sic] promised himself” (207). This is not mere misery, however; such insights
help us resist the foolish consistency of inertia. But skepticism shouldn’t freeze
us either. Its temperate mood shouldn’t prevent us from stepping behind the “. . .
screen and sheath in which Pan has protected his well-beloved flower,” to invoke
“The Poet” (197). In other words, we remain open to the future not only by heed-
ing the mortality of the present, but also by trusting our genius, or rather, in the
genius of self-trust. On my reading, then, to take a single day as a figure of indi-
viduation is to welcome dawn as well as darkness. When the day dims, we should
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dally among our uncertainties, honest in our id ling. But when our genius flows
we should relate to ourselves, in our unfolding, as Emerson relates to one
inflamed. “If a man is inflamed and carried away by his thought, to that degree
that he forgets the authors and the public, and heeds only this one dream, which
holds him like an insanity, let me read his paper, and you may have all the argu-
ments and histories and criticism” (194).
Notes
1. Due to constraints of time and space, I will not engage in any systematic fashion the various
scholars, most notably Stanley Cavell, who are also working to recover Emerson. An artificial soli-
tude thus surrounds this paper. Second, I have referenced Emerson’s Prose and Poetry (Porte 2001)
wherever possible so that a reader might turn to Emerson’s texts with greater ease.
2. I would add that this thought marks more of a problem for Emerson than the conclusion of
an argument. In a journal entry dated May 26, 1837, he writes: “Who shall define to me an
Individual? I behold with awe and delight the many illustrations of the One Universal Mind. I see
my being imbedded in it. As a plant in the earth so I grow in God. I am only a form of him. . . . A
believer in Unity, yet I behold two. . . . Cannot I conceive the Universe without a contradiction?”
(Whicher 1957, 62).
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